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I. INTRODUCTION
Armed confrontations between states and non-state actors have
received greater profile in recent years, regenerating debates over who
may be targeted during hostilities. Questions relating to membership
in the armed forces of non-state actors and the participation of civilians
in hostilities have been given new life as the interpretation and
application of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) are reassessed in light
of the realities of conflicts such as those in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,
Yemen, and Gaza.
The twenty-first century has already produced a significant
volume of perspectives on these questions. National and international
courts have considered them in several cases, with the 2006 Israeli
Supreme Court case Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
Government of Israel (Targeted Killings) capturing a particularly
prominent place in this discussion.' Academic publications have
* Colonel, Head of the International Law Department, Military Advocate General's
Corps, Israel Defense Forces. LLB (Tel-Aviv University), LLM (Tel-Aviv University),
LLM (New York University), JSD (New York University). This article is written in the
author's personal capacity and does not necessarily represent the official views of the
Israel Defense Forces or the State of Israel. The author thanks Noam Neuman, Ori
Pomson, and Guy Keinan for their invaluable support in writing this article.
1. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov't of Israel 2 IsrLR 459 (2006)
(Isr.) [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case].
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likewise dealt with this issue, many of them following the discussion
encouraged by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC Interpretive
Guidance).2 Of most importance, however, are the views expressed by
states in various publications, usually in their military manuals:
Canada (2001), the United Kingdom (2004),4Australia (2006),5 Mexico
(2009),6 Colombia (2009),7 France (2012),8 Germany (2013),9 Norway
(2013),1o Israel (2015),11 and the United States (2015).12
In this brief Article, I shall focus on a few specific issues that, in
my mind, have particular relevance for contemporary and future
armed conflicts, and with respect to which the debate is still ongoing:
(a) the notion of "functional membership" in the armed forces of a non-
state actor; (b) whether civilians employed in research and
development projects qualify as direct participants in hostilities; and
(c) whether civilians engaged in certain financial activities qualify as
direct participants in hostilities.
2. NILs MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
3. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, JOINT
DOCTRINE MANUAL: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL
LEVELS § 406 (2001).
4. JOINT DOCTRINE & CONCEPTS CTR., JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT §§ 5.4.1, 15.6.5 (2004).
5. DEP'T OF DEF., AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 06.4: LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT § 5.27 (2006).
6. SECRETARIA DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL, MANUAL DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO PARA EL EJfRCITO Y F.A.M. (2009) [MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FOR THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE].
7. MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL, MANUAL DE DERECHO OPERACIONAL:
MANUAL FF.MM 3-41 POBLICO 47-51 (2009) [MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL LAW].
8. MINISTtRE DE LA DtFENSE, MANUEL DU DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMES 31 (2012)
[MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS]. It should be noted that the Manual
stipulates that it "n'a qu'une valeur indicative et ne peut en aucun cas 6tre consid6r4
comme un texte de r6f6rence ayant force juridique." Id. at 4 (explaining the manual is
only meant to be informative and not legally binding).
9. FED. MINISTRY OF DEF., JOINT SERVICE REGULATION (ZDV) 15/2: LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL §§303, 1308 (2013).
10. FORSVARSDEPARTEMENTET, MANUAL I KRIGENS FOLKERETT 51-58 (2013)
[MANUAL OF THE LAW OF WAR].
11. STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAzA CONFLICT: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS
¶T 264-70 (2015), http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/2014GazaConflict
FullReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8V42-TRAW] (archived Mar.
17, 2018) [hereinafter 2014 GAZA CONFLICT].
12. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.7 (2016) [hereinafter DOD MANUAL].
The Manual only reflects the positions of the Department of Defense, although it was
written with the support of additional departments.
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II. "FUNCTIONAL MEMBERSHIP" IN THE ARMED FORCES OF A PARTY
Hostilities are normally waged between the armed forces of the
parties to an armed conflict, whether they are states or non-state
actors (in the latter case, the armed forces are often called "organized
armed groups").'3
Under the traditional rules of LOAC, members of armed forces are
lawful targets of attack.14 When an armed conflict occurs between
states, determining membership is regularly based on the premise that
individuals in a state's armed forces wear uniforms and display fixed
emblems. Accordingly, when a determination establishes that an
individual is wearing a military's uniform, or that the individual
signed up for the military, that individual may be targeted without
further investigation.15 In such a scenario, it does not even matter
what the individual's exact role in the armed forces is, since there is no
requirement for the individual to actually engage in combat to be a
lawful object of attack.'6
Now, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance rejects the possibility of
assessing targetability on the basis of formal membership in non-state
armed forces on the assumption that such membership "is rarely
formalized through an act of integration other than taking up a certain
function for the group; and it is not consistently expressed through
uniforms, fixed distinctive signs, or identification cards."'7 The ICRC
goes even further by arguing:
In view of the wide variety of cultural, political, and military contexts in which
organized armed groups operate, there may be various degrees of affiliation with
such groups that do not necessarily amount to "membership" within the meaning
of IHL. In one case, affiliation may turn on individual choice, in another on
involuntary recruitment, and in yet another on more traditional notions of clan
or family. In practice, the informal and clandestine structures of most organized
armed groups and the elastic nature of membership render it particularly
13. See, e.g., INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 27-28. However, the term
"organized armed group" sometimes refers to the non-state party as a whole, including
its civilian components. See, for example, Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No IT-94-1-AR72,
Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 70 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadi6]. For clarity, this Article
will therefore use the term "armed forces."
14. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 257, ¶ 78 (July 8).
15. Cf. Richard Baxter, Human Rights in War, 31 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCl.
4, 9-10 (1977) ("In the past it has been assumed that members of the armed forces
declare themselves to be combatants by wearing uniform and carrying arms openly.").
16. See, e.g., Morten Ruud, The Term Combatant: An Analysis, 24 MIL. L. & L.
WAR REV. 425, 428 (1985); United Nations, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 36, www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-
established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal (l st visited Mar. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cclUTT7-7SSH] (archived Mar. 14, 2018).
17. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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difficult to distinguish between a non-State party to the conflict and its armed
forces.18
The ICRC's sweeping rejection of targetability on the basis of
formal membership in non-state armed forces in all circumstances is
actually quite perplexing. There are certainly instances in which non-
state armed forces are more organized than state armed forces.1 9 Yet,
the ICRC is only willing to accept targetability on the basis of
membership for the latter, since there are instances in which the
former are less organized than state armed forces. To add to the
perplexity, the ICRC admits in the context of dissident armed forces
that if "they remain organized under the structures of the State armed
forces to which they formerly belonged, these structures should
continue to determine individual membership in dissident armed
forces as well." 20 If there is an exception for such non-state armed
forces, why should others be treated differently?21 Finally, and most
importantly, states and scholars alike accept the idea that formal
membership in the armed forces of a non-state actor may be
established.22
18. Id. at 33.
19. For example, in 2014, it was argued that "ISIS is better organized, supplied
and led than the Iraqi Army or the Sunni tribal militias." See Oliver North, The Good
News that Nobody Knows, FOX NEWS (Nov. 3, 2014), www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2014/11/03/good-news-that-nobody-knows.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/6EF6-39DB] (archived Mar. 14, 2018); see also, e.g., The Sudan People's
Liberation Army Act (2009); NICHOLAS BLANFORD, WARRIORS OF GOD: INSIDE
HEZBOLLAH'S THIRTY-YEAR STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL 111 (2011) (referring to
Hezbollah's "arduous induction process"); cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgment, ¶ 118-19 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005). It is not
clear whether the ICRC's analysis would differ if it were to accept that in reality there
are non-state armed forces which have formal and organized structures, equivalent to
the way memberships is established within state armed forces.
20. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 32.
21. Moreover, it is questionable whether the groups envisioned by the ICRC-
those of "informal and clandestine structures"-which purportedly give weight to its
assumption that non-state armed forces are often not sufficiently organized to treat them
under the paradigm of formal membership, would even meet the organizational
condition for the existence of a NIAC. Cf. Tadi6, supra note 13, ¶ 70; G.LA.D. Draper,
The Geneva conventions of 1949, 114 RECUEIL DES COURS 59, 89-91 (1965); Eric David,
Le concept de conflit armd : enjeux et ambigutis, in PERMANENCE ET MUTATIONS DU
DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMtS 55, 57-64 (Vincent Chetail ed., 2013).
22. See, e.g., MANUEL DU DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMES 31 (2012); 2014 GAZA
CONFLICT, supra note 11, ¶ 264; THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 4 (Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H.B. Garraway &
Yoram Dinstein eds., 2006); COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS §4789 (Jean Pictet et al. eds., 1987); Kenneth Watkin,
Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC "Direct Participation in
Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 641, 690-691 (2009)
[hereinafter Watkin Opportunity Lost]; Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of
International Humanitarian Law in Future Wars, 71 INT'L L. STUD. 39, 54 (1998); Brian
J. Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE (Apr. 1, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/1/releases/
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Indeed, many states and scholars find the ICRC's analysis in this
regard to be neither persuasive nor reflective of customary
international law. Rather, they hold the position that formal
membership in armed forces is sufficient for determining the status of
an individual as a lawful target.2 3 At the same time, one may
nevertheless wonder whether formal membership fully captures the
notion of membership in all instances. In certain cases, including those
in which the armed forces have no clear recruitment mechanisms, the
"functional" approach might be appropriate; that is, an approach which
analyzes the function an individual exercises and, on that basis,
determines whether that individual may be considered a member of
armed forces and thus may be targetable.24 Under a functional
approach, for example, an individual fighting on behalf of the armed
forces may be considered a member thereof even in cases where he or
she is not a formal member.
The functional membership theory has in fact been suggested in a
number of sources. Indeed, the ICRC proposed a functional
membership theory in its ICRC Interpretive Guidance.2 5 In a report
published in late 2016, the Obama administration presented its
position on the subject, recognizing the possibility of both formal and
functional membership as alternative bases for targeting an
individual.26 A similar position is found in the United States
Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual.27 Literature has
also supported theories of functional membership, with some scholars
seeing it as an alternative existing alongside formal membership-based
targetability.28
remarks/255493.htm [https://perma.ccl9EXC-VUUF] (archived Mar. 17, 2018); see also
Djamchid Momtaz, Le droit international humanitaire applicable aux conflits armis non
internationaux, 292 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 93 (2001).
23. See, similarly, Monika Hlavkova, Reconstructing the Civilian/Combatant
Divide: A Fresh Look at Targeting in Non-international Armed Conflict, 19 J. CONF. &
SEC. L. 251, 263 (2014). See also authorities cited in note 22.
24. This is true for both state and non-state armed forces. Nils Melzer, however,
has argued that treaty law only recognizes formal membership in State armed forces.
See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 831, 843-845 (2009). While it is
true that most state militaries rely on formal membership, there is nothing in the Hague
Regulations or in GC III which supports the arguments that these treaties demand such
membership, thus rendering his argument unpersuasive.
25. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 32-33.
26. THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL
SECURITY OPERATIONS (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/white
house.gov/files/documents/LegalPolicy_.Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/49AE-YRU3]
(archived Mar. 17, 2018) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS].
27. DOD MANUAL, supra note 12, §5.7.3.
28. See SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 360 (2012); David McBride, Who is a Member: Targeted Killings against
Members of Organized Armed Groups, 30 AUST. Y.B. INT'L L. 47, 87 (2012); Hannes
2018] 963
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Once we recognize the possibility of functional membership, the
following question ensues: what amounts to functional membership?
The ICRC's answer to this question has garnered significant attention
in recent years and triggered much-and sometimes quite heated-
discussion.29 According to the ICRC:
[Mlembership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole,
namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the conflict.
Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in an
organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for
the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities (hereafter:
"continuous combat function").3 0
This ICRC demand for continuous combat function (CCF) has
been criticized and-explicitly and implicitly-rejected by numerous
states and scholars.3 1 Kenneth Watkin, for example, argues that the
ICRC Interpretive Guidance defines "membership" in armed forces too
restrictively, and thus limits the cases in which a member of an armed
force could be targeted to an unrealistically narrow group of persons.32
Others note that as a matter of law, just as a member of a state's armed
Eechaute, Non-international armed conflict: a trigger for the rules on targeting?,
UNIVERSITEIT GENT 70 (2016) https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUGO1/002/272/228/RUG01-
00227222820160001AC.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9K9-FZT9] (archived Mar. 17, 2018).
See also PROVIDENCE NGOY WALUPAKAH & SANDRA MUYA MIYANGA, LE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE A L'tPREUVE DU CONFLIT ARME EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO 197-
198 (2015); Jordan J. Paust, Operationalizing Use of Drones against Non-State Terrorists
under the International Law of Self-Defense, 8 ALB. GOVT L. REV. 166, 168 (2015). Cf.
Camille Marquis Bissonnette, The Definition of Civilians in Non-International Armed
Conflicts: The Perspective of Armed Groups, 7 J. INT'L HUMAN. STUD. 129 (2016); Naz K.
Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law
of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance,
5 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 225, 270 (2014).
29. A significant number of members of the group of experts requested their
names be omitted from the to-be-issued report, objecting to the possibility of their
affiliation with the stances stipulated in it. This led the ICRC to publish the document
as reflecting its own views on the subject. See EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 112 (2015).
30. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 33.
31. See, e.g., Claire Landais, Colloque Droit et OPEX: Intervention, MINISTtRE
DES ARMEES 11 (Nov. 2015); 2014 GAZA CONFLICT, supra note 11, 1 264, n.422; DOD
MANUAL, supra note 12, §5.7.3; YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-62 (2015); Chris De Cock, Counter-Insurgency
Operations in Afghanistan. What about the 'Jus ad Bellum' and the 'Jus in Bello: Is the
Law Still Accurate?, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 97, 118-119 (2010); William H.
Boothby, Direct Participation in Hostilities-A Discussion of the ICRC Interpretive
Guidance, 1 J. INT'L HuMAN. LEGAL STUD. 143, 154 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical
Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 5, 24 (2010); SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 28, at 361; Egan,
supra note 22. Cf. Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
27, 37 (2013) (considering CCF a "new category" and "arguably lex ferenda").
32. See generally Watkin Opportunity Lost, supra note 22, at 641.
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forces who does not ordinarily serve a combat role may be targeted at
any time, so may similar members of non-state armed forces.33 After
all, armed forces have, over the course of history, always included
members who do not exercise CCF, such as arms deals negotiators,
band members, financial managers, quartermasters, liaison personnel,
cooks, legal advisers, and so forth.
At the same time, the mere fact an individual is performing a
function in the armed forces that is often conducted by a formal
member of armed forces does not necessarily suffice for considering
that individual a lawful target. For example, in certain armed forces
cooking or repair services (e.g., plumbing and electricity) are now
provided by external contractors despite being previously provided by
members of the armed forces. It seems clear that individuals
performing such functions would not be considered members of the
armed forces, liable to attack at any time (especially when he or she
provides such services to a range of customers). In other words,
whether the function is often conducted by formal members in state
armed forces is potentially relevant but not necessarily decisive.
In this regard, in the abovementioned Obama administration
report, it is stipulated that determining whether a person is
functionally a member of armed forces will thus not only include
looking to "the extent to which that person performs functions for the
benefit of the group that are analogous to those traditionally performed
by members of a country's armed forces" but also "whether that person
is carrying out or giving orders to others within the group" and
"whether that person has undertaken certain acts that reliably connote
meaningful integration into the group."34 Building upon this report,
how can we determine the existence-or lack-of an individual's
functional membership in armed forces?
In essence, in establishing functional membership, it would be
appropriate to examine whether the individual's function embodies
"the critical agency relationship with others in the armed group, which
is the LOAC justification for status-based targeting."3 5 I would like to
suggest a number of substantive elements of potential relevance when
assessing whether this is the case; the presence of each element is
neither always necessary nor always sufficient, and this should not be
regarded as an exhaustive list. First, one indication supporting the
33. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 28, at 361.
34. REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS, supra note 26, at 20.
35. See Rachel E. VanLandingham, Meaningful Membership, Making War a Bit
More Criminal, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 79, 121 (2013). Such agency relationship might be
established if, for example, the individual's conduct indicates that he or she is acting "as
an agent of the belligerent group leadership for the purpose of engaging in hostile
functions." Geoffrey Corn, Two Sides of the Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct
Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Noninternational Armed Conflicts,
in COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 58, 69
(William Banks ed., 2013).
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conclusion that an individual is functionally a member of armed forces
is the tasks the individual is executing. In this regard, there are tasks
that are usually exercised by members of armed forces,36 such as
responsibility for acquiring weapons for the armed forces. The strength
of the existence of such an element may depend on whether the
function is seldom outsourced.3 7 Second, a relevant indication is
whether, and to what degree, the person is subject to an existing
group's hierarchical structure-which is indeed important for
ascertaining the existence of an organization in and of itself3 8-such as
being subject to orders and obligated to complete certain tasks. Third,
physical location may constitute a pertinent indication,3 9 such as use
of the armed forces' facilities (e.g., offices) for conducting tasks. Fourth,
there are certain acts and exercises that are often associated with
joining armed forces. In addition to certain forms of oaths, it is possible
to refer to basic training and certain refresher training courses.40
There are other acts which are typical of persons who are members of
armed forces, such as preparedness to fulfill any responsibility the
armed forces requests of the individual.41 Fifth, the relationship of the
individual with additional armed forces should also be taken into
account.42
In concluding this Part, it should be emphasized that there is a
paucity in evidence of state practice and opinio juris regarding the
necessary elements for functional membership in armed forces.
Accordingly, it is difficult to achieve any definite answer on the
necessary-or relevant lements for functional membership. It will
hence be of importance and interest to see how state practice develops
in the years ahead.
36. Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian
Immunity in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress through Practice, 88
INTL L. STUD. 181, 189 (2012).
37. Compare the discussion in the context of private military contractors. See
Frauke Renz, The Role of Private Military and Security Companies: Corporate Dogs of
War or Civilians Operating in Hostile Environments, 27 Swiss. REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 305,
327 (2017); Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy ... If We Can't Buy!': The Privatization of
Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing 'Inherently Governmental Functions', 19 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 1055 (2008).
38. Prosecutor v. Boikoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, T 195 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
39. See VanLandingham, supra note 35, at 122-123.
40. Cf. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 64 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
41. See VanLandingham, supra note 35, at 125.
42. If an individual performing a function-or a few functions-for several
different armed forces, the question will be whether he or she is a member of any of these
forces, and if so, which.
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III. CIVILIAN SCIENTISTS AND WEAPON SPECIALISTS AND DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
Military power is highly dependent on the quality and quantity of
means of warfare, and states and non-state actors alike are investing
significant resources in an attempt to gain-or preserve-a
technological edge over each other. This is not a new phenomenon, and
it may be traced back to various instances in which parties to armed
conflicts sought to gain the upper hand during the course of hostilities.
The Manhattan Project is a well-known example in this regard:
undertaken by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in
the 1940s, and involving many scientists who were not members of the
respective states' armed forces, the project gave birth to an
unsurpassable military capability-the first nuclear weapons-which
brought about the submission of Japan and the end of World War II.
Similarly, with the ever-increasing complexity of weapons
technology, the services of weapons specialists are increasingly being
acquired by armed forces. Such specialists may assist in instructing
the use of complex weapons, providing maintenance, and providing
assistance in real-time employment circumstances. Indeed, it can often
be the case that without the assistance of weapons specialists, a
capability will be of little or no use to the armed forces.
In many instances, the individuals who are involved in research
and development, as well as weapons specialists, are not members of
the armed forces, and therefore qualify as civilians under LOAC. As a
rule, civilians are protected from attack unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.43 Nevertheless, is it possible to
argue that such individuals are taking a direct part in hostilities?
Now, any serious analysis of direct participation in hostilities
must begin with the nexus between the act or activity in question and
the hostilities. Clearly, without such nexus there can be no direct
participation in hostilities. Thus, persons involved in research,
development, and maintenance activities do not qualify as direct
participants in hostilities if their conduct is unrelated to the
hostilities.44 For example, scientists such as those of Raytheon, an
American company responsible for the development of the Patriot
surface-to-air missile system, do not qualify as persons directly
participating in the hostilities of every armed conflict where the Patriot
system is employed, even where their contribution leads to a
substantial increase in military power. The work of Raytheon's Patriot
43. This rule of customary international law is reflected in Article 51(3) of
Additional Protocol I. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 49(1), June 30, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3.
44. Cf. JEAN-FRANQOIS QUtGUINER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
BACKGROUND PAPER 18-19 (2003).
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scientists is not related to the hostilities of a specific conflict. Rather,
Raytheon was employed by the US Department of Defense to develop
a new surface-to-air missile system as part of the ongoing effort by the
United States to preserve its military superiority. Legally speaking,
Raytheon's scientists were not taking part-directly or indirectly-in
any hostilities. Indeed, a lack of nexus between the activity and the
hostilities is the main reason many research and development
activities do not qualify as direct participation in hostilities to begin
with.
The same conclusion can be reached with regard to weapons
specialists when their services are not provided in the context of
particular hostilities. For example, when Raytheon sends its weapons
specialists to assist armed forces in operating and maintaining the
Patriot system not in the context of a specific armed conflict, they do
not qualify as directly participating in hostilities, due to a lack of nexus
between their activity and any hostilities.45
However, the matter is arguably more complex when the acts
conducted by the weapons research and development scientists and
weapons specialists are being conducted in the course of an armed
conflict for the sole purpose of influencing a belligerent's conduct of
hostilities in that armed conflict.4 6 In discussions on this issue, states,
scholars, and other stakeholders tend to highlight different aspects
they find pertinent in assessing direct participation in hostilities. It is
to these contentions we now turn.
On the one hand, it has been contended that the most important
question is whether the activity has solely "operational" effects, or
whether it also provides a contribution at a "tactical" level.47 A similar
view was expressed in the ICRC consultation process on the notion of
direct participation in hostilities, where a few experts argued that close
causal proximity was needed between the act in question and the harm
anticipated to result from it. Pursuant to this view, only scientists
whose work involves such proximity are considered to be taking a
45. See Giulio Bartolini, The Participation of Civilians in Hostilities, in RULES
AND INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PUT TO THE TEST OF RECENT
ARMED CONFLICTS 321, 379 (Michael J. Matheson & Djamchid Momtaz eds., 2010);
SECOND EXPERT MEETING: DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES: SUMMARY REPORT 6
(2004) [hereinafter SECOND EXPERT MEETING]; QUtGUINER, supra note 44, at 6-7; INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw: SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2003). Nevertheless, such
civilian workers assume the risks arising from the fact that the weapon factory itself
may be regarded as a military objective and therefore lawfully targeted, subject to the
rules of proportionality and precautions.
46. It is no coincidence, for instance, that the meeting laying the groundwork for
the Manhattan Project took place on 18 December 1941, only a few days after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. See VINCENT C. JONES, MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND
THE ATOMIC BOMB 35 (1985). Indeed, many weapon programs are launched, accelerated
or amended to meet the concrete challenges and needs faced by a belligerent in a specific
armed conflict.
47. See Bartolini, supra note 45, at 379.
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direct part in hostilities.48 Likewise, according to this position,
weapons specialists assisting a party to an armed conflict in operating
capabilities-such as a sophisticated weapon system to be employed at
a tactical level, or providing maintenance for weapons systems to be
employed imminently4 9-would constitute direct participants in
hostilities.5 0 On the other hand, neither tactical effects nor causal
proximity are requisite conditions for direct participation in hostilities.
Indeed, it is widely accepted that direct participation in hostilities does
not require tactical effects,51 whereas close causal proximity is likewise
rejected by most authorities.52 To elaborate why the contrasting
positions mentioned above are too narrow, it is apt to bring an example
in this regard.
Consider a scenario where Arcadia is engaged in an ongoing
armed conflict, in which its aircraft are ineffective due to the
adversary's strong counter-air-defense capabilities. Consequently,
many Arcadian planes and pilots are lost in action and the Arcadian
military is having difficulty completing its most important missions.
Concerned by this reality, a small group of civilian scientists
specializing in electronic countermeasures (devices designed to deceive
air-defense detection systems) approach the Arcadian Minister of
Defense and offer their services: within six months, they intend to
develop a system, while consulting with Arcadian fighter pilots,
allowing Arcadian planes to strike the enemy's targets without any
obstacle. The Ministry of Defense accepts their proposal and hires
them so they can establish a special task force. Within a short period
of time, they make significant progress.
Clearly, the case of the Arcadian scientists is very different from
that of the Raytheon scientists. While both groups of scientists are
48. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, FOURTH EXPERT MEETING ON THE NOTION
OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES: SUMMARY REPORT 49 (2006) [hereinafter
FOURTH EXPERT MEETING].
49. Such allegations were made, for example, regarding the Vinnell Corporation,
the contractor entrusted with training the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The civilians
employed by the corporation performed significant functions during the first Gulf War
and accompanied the armed force to the theatre of operations with the aim of providing
further advice (particularly during confrontations in Khafji), and as a result they have
been considered as civilians taking direct participation in hostilities. See Bartolini, supra
note 45, at 368.
50. Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511
[hereinafter Schmitt Humanitarian Law]; see QUtGUINER, supra note 44, at 17-19.
51. For example, with respect to issuing operational military orders; collecting
operational intelligence; operational planning; and so forth. See NILS MELZER, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: BACKGROUND PAPER 13 (2004); SECOND EXPERT
MEETING, supra note 45, at 3; Schmitt Humanitarian Law, supra note 51, at 23.
52. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 12, 229-30; NIS MELZER, INT'L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, THIRD EXPERT MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES: SuMMARY REPORT 28 (2005); Schmitt, suprd note 50, at 15-16.
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composed of civilians, the Arcadian research and development project
is closely related to the hostilities being conducted between Arcadia
and its adversary. It was the operational paralysis suffered by the
Arcadian air force during the hostilities which prompted the project,
and the scientists involved received all the necessary assistance and
support from the relevant components of the Arcadian Ministry of
Defense and the Arcadian armed forces. Moreover, the scientists
engaged in the project with the express intention of providing Arcadia
a technological breakthrough expected to change the course of the
conflict.
When civilians knowingly join ongoing hostilities in such a
manner, it may be plausible to argue they are taking a direct part in
hostilities and thus are rendering themselves lawful targets under
LOAC. It should be noted in this regard that the abovementioned
Manhattan Project is usually analyzed along these lines, considering
its scientists were involved in ongoing hostilities to a significant
extent.53 An official US memorandum from 1989, for example,
classifies the scientists involved in the project-as well as their
German counterparts engaged in developing new types of rockets
during World War II-as direct participants in hostilities, since they
occupied "key positions in a weapons program regarded as vital to a
nation's national security or war aims."54 Several scholars likewise
agree with this position.5 5 Indeed, as the ICRC Interpretive Guidance
acknowledges, such instances bring into question the aforementioned
general claim that scientific research and development is at most
"indirect" participation.5 6
Weapon development may arguably constitute direct participation
in hostilities even in less "game-changing" circumstances.57 A case in
53. ' See JONES, supra note 46, at 35.
54. W. Hays Parks, Executive Order 12333 and Assassination 6 (Nov. 2, 1989).
As a possible (although not decisive) indication of direct participation in such cases, the
memorandum suggests taking into account whether the relevant specialist has been
given immunity from military service on the basis that his or her value to his State's war
effort in his or her civilian position is greater than the value of him or her serving in the
military. Id.
55. Several experts who participated in the ICRC consultation process are
mentioned as supporting this position in the context of weapon design and development.
See FOURTH EXPERT MEETING, supra note 48, at 49. For further support, see AVRIL
McDONALD, THE CHALLENGES To INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
PRINCIPLES OF DISTINCTION AND PROTECTION FROM THE INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF
CIVILIANS IN HOSTILITIES 18-19 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Direct Participation in
Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION: FESTSCHRIFT FUR DIETER FLECK 509 (Horst Fischer ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Schmitt Direct Participation].
56. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 53 n.122.
57. For example, Michael Schmitt suggests that "an individual performing an
indispensable function in making possible the application of force against the enemy is
directly participating", and states further that "the appropriate test is whether that
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point is the recent Iraq War, in which coalition forces were regularly
confronted with large numbers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
laid in various locations, causing many casualties. The IEDs were often
designed and manufactured by civilians, and so discussion ensued over
whether these civilians qualified as direct participants in hostilities.
During the ICRC consultation process, several experts opined that this
was an instance of direct participation, stressing the contribution made
to the ongoing hostilities.5 8 Additional scholars agreed with this
analysis in two subsequent academic consultation processes,59 as well
as in various publications.60
In conclusion, it appears that in certain instances a plausible
argument can be made for the qualification of civilian weapons
developers and weapon specialists as direct participants in hostilities.
In determining whether this is the case, one must analyze all the
relevant factors, and especially the existence and degree of the nexus
between the act in question and the hostilities.
IV. CERTAIN FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS AND DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
Military operations at all levels-strategic, operational, and
tactical-are shaped by financing. Correct handling and budgeting of
financial resources by the armed forces is thus a crucial part of the
exercise of military power. Armed forces have historically established
complex mechanisms for performing these financial functions, creating
various duties for officers and other personnel. Some roles are general
in nature and include managing payrolls, overseeing financial
planning, reviewing policy, or monitoring financial systems. Other
roles are more operational or tactical, including duties such as wiring
funds for an impending operation or purchasing the requisite arms for
it.
When the party to the conflict is a state, financial functions of
these sorts are usually performed within the armed forces. Matters
individual is an integral facet of the uninterrupted process of defeating the enemy." See
Schmitt Direct Participation, supra note 55, at 529.
58. FOURTH EXPERT MEETING, supra note 48, at 49-50; NILS MELZER, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, FIFTH EXPERT MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES: EXPERT COMMENTS & ELEMENTS OF RESPONSE 28 (2008).
Contra INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 54.
59. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD
UNIv., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 113
(2013); TALLIN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS 430 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). Both Manuals
regard such cases to be unsettled as a matter of law.
60. See generally Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC.
J. 45 (2010).
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may be more complex, however, with respect to non-state actors. In
some instances, those performing the aforementioned financial
functions will be formal members of the armed forces. In other
instances, they may be performed by individuals who are not formal
members of the armed forces. Is such an individual a lawful target of
attack? As described in Part II, functions performed by an individual
for the armed forces may, depending on the circumstances, render him
or her a functional member thereof. In the context of certain financial
roles, one scholar opined:
[A] person could be seen as working within a non-State armed group if they were
acting as the director of its finances. In other words, handling finances in a
roughly analogous manner to State military forces. This would include members
of organized armed groups carrying a 'finance' logistics function such as
internally managing the resources for the armed group.6 1
Under this analysis, such individuals may be lawful targets as
functional members of the armed forces.
It must be stressed, however, that looking at financial functions
through the prism of membership in the armed forces is somewhat
misleading. Following various domestic and international
developments aimed at halting the financing of terrorist
organizations,62 many non-state actors have creatively adapted their
mechanisms of not only obtaining funds but also of handling and
budgeting them once they are in their possession.63 In certain instances
it has therefore become difficult, if not impossible, to make analogies
between the financial conduct of state armed forces and that of non-
state actors. Nevertheless, such analogies are currently the prominent
tool used to identify functional membership in the armed forces of non-
state actors, and so those performing financial functions will often be
seen as civilians in the eyes of the law. In turn, these situations raise
the question of whether certain financial activities can qualify as direct
participation in hostilities.
61. KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE
USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT 309 (2016) [hereinafter WATKIN FIGHTING].
62. At the international level, the most prominent developments have been the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999),
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 2161 (2014), 2170
(2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2253 (2015), 2322 (2016) and 2368 (2017), and the
establishment of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee. See also NICHOLAS
RYDER, THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERRORISM: A REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORIST
FINANCING STRATEGIES SINCE 2001 (2015); ROBERTO DURRIEU, RETHINKING MONEY
LAUNDERING & FINANCING OF TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); ARABINDA
ACHARYA, TARGETING TERRORIST FINANCING: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND NEW
REGIMES (2009).
63. For an overview of the financial modus operandi of terrorist organizations
,such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, see ACHARYA, supra note 62, at 45-80;
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC
STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (2015).
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As was specifically mentioned in the Israeli Targeted Killings
case, "a person who aids . . . by general strategic analysis, and
grants . . . logistical, general support, including monetary aid" is not
taking a direct part, but rather an indirect part, in hostilities.6 4 This
position is also reflected in scholarly literature, much of which supports
the position that, in general, the mere fact that an individual makes
monetary contributions to the armed forces does not render him or her
a direct participant in hostilities.65 The question might be more
challenging, however, in more complex instances, and I would like to
briefly discuss two of them: one where the function directly supports a
specific military activity; and another where the individual is assisting
the armed forces in moving funds across the battlefield for operational
purposes.
Consider a hypothetical operation by the Islamic State (also
known as ISIS) against the United States, in the context of the ongoing
armed conflict between them. Planned by a special military unit of the
Islamic State, the operation involves crashing an airplane into a
civilian hospital situated in Iraq and run by a European humanitarian
non-governmental organization. However, due to strict restrictions in
Iraq on matters involving aircraft, the operation can only be carried
out through purchasing an airplane and loading it with a large
quantity of explosives. Since an airplane costs millions of USD, which
the unit does not have, its commander contacts a wealthy Iraqi
businessman who sympathizes with the ideology of the Islamic State.
After ensuring he can be trusted, the commander tells the
businessman about the planned operation and asks him to provide the
funds needed for the purchase of the airplane as well as to register it
in his name. The businessman enthusiastically agrees and begins
making arrangements so that the funds can be transferred within a
few days, with the attack scheduled to take place shortly thereafter.
Fortunately, the phone call between the businessman and the Islamic
State is tracked and eavesdropped, and neutralizing the businessman
seems to be the only way to thwart the impending attack. May the
businessman be targeted as a direct participant in hostilities?
Unlike the situations often referred to in the literature, as well as
in the Targeted Killings case, the businessman hypothetical deals with
a deliberate contribution to a specific attack. Maintaining that such
instances amount to direct participation in hostilities appears to be
uncontroversial. For example, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance lends
support to this argument. While the Guidance maintains that
64. See, e.g., Targeted Killings Case, supra note 1, ¶ 35. See also Frederic
Wiesenbach, Uncertainty on Somalia's Beaches-The Legal Regime of Onshore Anti-
Piracy Operations, 19 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 85, 103 (2014).
65. See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Targeting "Islamic State" Oil Facilities, 90 INT'L
L. STUD. 499, 509 (2014); Manon Ballestero, Les boucliers humains volontaires: des civils
ne participant pas directement aux hostilitis, 41 REV. BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 265, 284
(2008).
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providing the adversary with supplies and services or transporting
weapons and equipment generally constitutes indirect participation, it
recognizes that such activities amount to direct participation if "carried
out as an integral part of a specific military operation designed to
directly cause" harm such as injury, loss of life, or damage to
property.66 The United States DoD Law of War Manual does not deal
with such situations specifically, but it encourages consideration of
"the degree to which the act is connected to military operations"; "the
degree to which the act contributes to a party's military action against
the opposing party"; "whether the activity is intended to advance the
war aims of one party to the conflict to the detriment of the opposing
party"; and "whether the act is the proximate or 'but for' cause of death,
injury, or damage to persons or objects belonging to the opposing
party."67
Whether one adopts a perspective like that of the United States or
an approach such as the ICRC's, the businessman's role in the Islamic
State's attack certainly meets the criteria of direct participation in
hostilities. Much appears to depend on what the individual in question
knows about his or her role in the operation as well as his or her level
of involvement. For example, if the individual provides funds without
knowing what will be done with them, or if the funds are transferred
to the general financial pool of the armed forces, that individual would
probably not be considered a direct participant in hostilities, since, as
noted, general monetary aid does not suffice. However, as the
businessman hypothetical shows, the analysis may be different in a
case where the contribution goes towards a specific attack that the
individual is aware of and intends to participate in, when the
contribution is necessary for its execution.
Some questions may nevertheless remain with regard to the "for
such time" condition. Even if the businessman is considered to be
directly participating in hostilities, the temporal element of that
participation must be considered and assessed. However, there are
certainly instances in khich this temporal condition would be met.6 8
Such an instance may be where there is information that the person is
aware of the planned attack, and has agreed to transfer funds in the
very near future, but has not yet done so. In such a situation, the
temporal requirement would without a doubt be met, and as a result it
seems that person might be lawfully targeted under LOAC.
It is important to note that the question of whether a person
funding a specific military operation may be regarded as directly
66. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 53. See also Michelle Lesh, Direct
Participation in Hostilities, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
181, 185 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack eds., 2016).
67. DOD MANUAL, supra note 12, at 229-230.
68. See generally Bill Boothby, "And For Such Time As": The Time Dimension to
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 741 (2010).
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participating in hostilities is different from the issue of classification of
"war-sustaining objects" as military objectives,69 as the two relate to
separate issues. Defining whether an object constitutes a military
objective, pursuant to the customary definition of military objectives,
relates to whether the object provides the adversary an "effective
contribution to military action" and whether attacking the object
"offers a definite military advantage."70 Conversely, whether a person
is directly participating in hostilities concerns other issues, most
notably the nexus between the act or activities of the person and the
hostilities.7 1 As a result, even those who reject the notion that war-
sustaining objects might constitute military objectives may
nevertheless agree that there are instances in which a person who
funds a specific military operation meets the direct participation in
hostilities criteria.72
Additional, and more complex, questions arise with respect to
individuals assisting the armed forces in moving funds across the
battlefield for operational purposes. In light of domestic and
international sanctions, as well as other measures taken to limit
terrorism financing, such assistance has become essential for the
ability of non-state actors to carry out their military operations. For
example, following the gaining of control by the Islamic State of
territories in Iraq and Syria, branches of banks in these territories
were shut down, leaving the Islamic State unable to use the financial
institutions in those states for moving money. As a result, the Islamic
State established a network of confidants in the region charged with
transferring funds to and from ISIS-held territories to finance ISIS
activities, including its military operations. An elaborate Wall Street
Journal article publicly revealed a small part of this system,
69. Such objects include, in particular, "the economic infrastructure used to
generate revenue for an enemy's armed forces." See Ryan Goodman, The Obama
Administration and Targeting 'War-Sustaining" Object in Noninternational Armed
Conflict, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 663 (2016). For contrasting views, see YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
109-110 (3d ed. 2016); Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims,
Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26 (Eritrea-Ethiopia), 135 ILR 565, 121 (2005).
70. See, in this regard, Christine Byron, International Humanitarian Law and
Bombing Campaigns: Legitimate Military Objectives and Excessive Collateral Damage,
13 Y.B. INT'L HuM. L. 175, 188 (2010); Robert Kolb, Considgrations ur l'application du
droit international humanitaire par la Commission arbitrale Erythrde/Ethiopie, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW ACTORS, NEW CONCEPTS, CONTINUING DILEMMAS: LIBER
AMICORUM BO IDAR BAKOTI6 519, 538 (Budislav Vukas & Trpimir M. Sogi6 eds., 2010).
71. Such a difference is not only with regard to attacking persons as opposed to
objects, but also with regard to targeting different classes of persons. For example, the
criteria for attacking members of the armed forces is different from the criteria for
attacking civilians taking a direct participation in hostilities. In principle, every member
of the armed forces is a lawful target whereas only civilians who meet the criteria of
taking direct part in hostilities may be targeted.
72. Cf. Robert McLaughlin, An Australian Perspective on Non-International
Armed Conflict: Afghanistan and East Timor, 88 INT'L L. STUD. 293, 302 (2012).
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specifically referring to the conduct of individuals who run exchange
houses and shell companies:
Their network works on trust, with members honoring real-time money transfer
orders between offices. People pay cash in one office and a recipient draws the
equivalent funds at a distant locale, a Middle Eastern practice known as hawala
that predates the modern banking system. [. . .] They settle their accounts by
shuttling bank notes, often through war zones.7 3
Clearly, general monetary assistance, such as transferring
donations made by Islamic State sympathizers, does not constitute
direct participation in hostilities. But, once more, whether a certain
activity qualifies as direct participation will turn on the circumstances,
and some situations are less clear-cut han others. For instance, what
is the correct legal assessment where money changers are specifically
asked to transfer funds closely connected to the military activity, such
as transferring money to weapons suppliers?74 What would our
assessment be if these money changers have close relations with the
armed forces, such as having designated offices in the bases of the
armed forces in order to better facilitate discussion and the provision
of financial services?75 Would the answer differ in instances where the
money changers know, on the one hand, precisely when the transferred
money is needed for general financing of the group, and where, on the
other hand, it is needed for concrete military actions? These are only
some examples, and many others are possible.
There are no hard and fast answers to these questions. Rather,
each instance must be assessed cautiously, taking all the relevant
factors and circumstances into account. Indeed, a case-by-case analysis
is often supported in legal doctrine;76 there are no compelling reasons
not to adopt a case-by-case approach in instances concerning
individuals who move military funds across the battlefield. Finally, one
should not rule out the possibility that a person may be directly
participating in hostilities on behalf of parties to different armed
73. Margaret Coker, How Islamic State's Secret Banking Network Prospers,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2016), www.wsj.com/articles/how-islamic-states-secret-banking-
network-prospers-1456332138 [https://perma.ce/9VMK-8L39] (archived Mar. 18, 2018).
74. The relevance of this example is evident in Treasury Sanctions Senior Isil
Financier and Two Money Services Businesses, U.S. DEP'T TREAS. (Dec. 13, 2016),
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j10684.aspx
[https://perma.ce/89XP-EBVX] (archived Mar. 18, 2018).
75. Cf. Coalition Forces Kill ISIS Financial Facilitator, OPERATION INHERENT
RESOLVE (June 23, 2017), www.inherentresolve.mil/News/Article/1227052/coalition-
forces-kill-isis-financial-facilitator/ [https://perma.cc/J7KY-LX6B] (archived Mar. 18,
2018).
76. Eric Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 19 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 289 (2010); Hin-Yan Liu, Leashing the Corporate Dogs of
War: The Legal Implications of the Modern Private Military Company, 15 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 141, 154 (2010); Schmitt Humanitarian Law, supra note 50, at 534.
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conflicts or different parties to the same conflict. Indeed, there is
nothing conceptually difficult regarding such a scenario.7
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Soon after the turn of the century, the late Shabtai Rosenne-a
former Legal Adviser to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one
of the most highly respected international legal scholars of modern
times-wrote that "[t]hrough the [20th] century . . . the international
community, and with it international law, have undergone a
continuous run of fundamental change, which became accelerated
during the second half of the century. Cumulatively, these changes
have led to the perplexity that so many of us feel today."78 Nearly two
decades later, it would seem that the noted changes have only
accelerated.
This Article has discussed three issues relating to the targeting of
persons: functional membership in armed forces; the possibility of
classifying persons involved in research and development projects, as
well as weapons specialists, as direct participants in hostilities; and
whether persons involved in particular financial activities may, in the
appropriate circumstances, constitute direct participants in hostilities.
Regarding each of these issues, it has been demonstrated that the legal
analysis which should be applied is quite complex, and does not always
lead to clear answers.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that, at the very least, the Article has
demonstrated that the issues discussed warrant further discussion. In
this regard, it is submitted that the question of functional membership
in armed forces requires a robust assessment of the person's function
and relationship to the armed forces. Likewise, in regard to civilians
involved in research and development projects, as well as weapons
specialists, it is necessary to account for the fundamental differences
in the roles persons play and consider the context where the particular
role is being played. Only then is it possible to reach a correct legal
answer to whether a particular civilian qualifies as a direct participant
in hostilities. Similarly, in regard to persons conducting certain
financial activities for the armed forces, it is difficult to contend that
persons providing monetary assistance to armed forces never qualify
as direct participants in hostilities. Here, too, there is an array of
possibilities for how financial assistance may manifest, and there is no
77. Factually, it is entirely possible that a person may provide simultaneous-
and even critical-financial services to multiple entities. Legally, there is no compelling
reason why such services could not amount to direct participation in the hostilities of
concurrent armed conflicts.
78. Shabtai Rosenne, The Perplexities of Modern International Law: General
Course on Public International Law, 291 RECUETL DES COURS 9, 25-26 (2001).
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"one size fits all" answer to the question of direct participation in
hostilities.
